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THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
By JOHN M. ENNIS
Member of the Bar, Los Angeles, California
"Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce be-
tween any of the several states . . . shall be liable in damages to any person
suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or,
in case of death of such employee, to his or her personal representative . . .
for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of
any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier or by reason of any
defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances,
machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment."'
This law is not a compensation law in the nature of workmen's com-
pensation. It is a special federal negligence law which gives the right to
employees of a railroad to bring a negligence action against their employer
for personal injuries suffered while on the job. If there are no facts which
indicate negligence on the part of the railroad, the employee has no right
under the act. There are situations where a man is injured through no
apparent fault of his own and there cannot be shown any negligence on the
part of the carrier. Such an injured railroad employee is without remedy;
he does not have recourse to state workmen's compensation law; there is no
federal compensation law to cover him, and if he is killed his widow has
no remedy. Counsel consulted by an injured railroad employee should
remember that negligence under F.E.L.A. is the same in degree as in other
types of personal injury actions based on negligence. The attorney in an
F.E.L.A. case should, however, be aware of a number of differences. The
writer will cover the major differences in the order in which they occur most
naturally to him, for no text is known which sets forth the differences between
the F.E.L.A. and the ordinary law of negligence.
First, section 51 of the act states that the railroad is responsible and
shall be liable in damages for injuries or death resulting in whole or in part
from the negligence of any of its agents or insufficiency in its equipment, etc.
The important words here are "in part." This means that, while the injured
man's employer may be only slightly negligent in a small part of the entire
picture of negligence, nevertheless the carrier is responsible under the act
and can be made responsible in damages. This becomes important in many
situations. For example, a switch engine may be moving over a crossing
with a switchman on the front footboard, which is a common place for him
to be. A truck may fail to yield the right of way to the switch engine and
145 U.S.C. 51. The first Federal Employers' Liability Act was passed by Congress in 1906 and
reenacted in 1908. The law is set out as amended in 1939 at 45 U.S.C., §§ 51-60. The F.E.L.A.
embraces the Safety Appliance Acts, 45 U.S.C., §§ 1-16, and the Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C.,
§§ 22-34.
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strike the engine, through gross negligence, causing an injury to the switch-
man. On first blush there would be no vestige of liability upon the part of
the railroad in such a picture. For example, if the switchman had given a
slow-down signal or a stop signal and if the engineer failed to heed these
hand signals, there would be a case of liability against the railroad although
it is obvious that the truck is the principal offender. In an ordinary negli-
gence case, the attorney would be justified in advising his client that the
carelessness of the truck driver was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
It would be difficult to convince a jury, if one was allowed to go to a jury,
that the truck driver was not the real cause of injury, and therefore the sole
proximate cause.
Under F.E.L.A., the courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
have rendered a number of decisions on the principle of proximate cause
which indicate that the situation above outlined would constitute a case for
liability. In this discussion reference is made to the two words "in part"
appearing in section 51 of the act. A leading case on this subject is that of
Eglasaer v. Scandrett.2 In this case the facts were these: The train was
stopped. The engineer decided to leave the cab to fix the automatic bell
ringer, which had failed to work automatically and thereafter had been oper-
ated by hand. The engineer told the fireman he was going to repair the
apparatus. The fireman offered to do the job. The engineer, however,
climbed out of the cab and on to the catwalk along the right side of the
engine. The fireman continued with certain duties in the cab, which duties
caused steam to escape so that the fireman could not see the engineer or
observe what he was doing. The fireman received a proceed signal from the
brakeman, he called to the engineer, and when the engineer failed to answer,
the fireman went to look for him and found him lying on the ground on the
left side of the cab.
There was no evidence available as to what caused the engineer to fall
from the catwalk of the engine or to receive the injuries which caused his
death. The jury decided that the somewhat remote negligence of the defective
bell ringer proximately caused the engineer's death.
The trial judge granted the motion of the defendant railroad and set
aside the verdict of the jury. This is what he said in effect:
". .. No proof was introduced that Engineer Mackin ever touched any
part of the bell ringer mechanism or that he fell while attempting its repair
or adjustment. The burden of proof was on the plaintiff to establish affirma-
tive proof that the defective bell ringer was the proximate cause. This the
plaintiff has failed to do."
The opinion of the circuit court was written by Mr. Justice Evans and
it is a clear statement of the law indicating that a remote act of negligence
2151 F.2d 562, 564-566 (1945).
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may be in part the cause of injury or death and sufficient to make the carrier
responsible under the F.E.L.A.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court with direc-
tion to enter judgment conforming to the jury's verdict for the plaintiff.
In doing so the Court said the facts showed that the engineer fell and was
injured and from these injuries died; that he was on the ground beneath
the bell apparatus which he had said he was going to repair; and that the
bell ringer was defective and the defendant was negligent with respect to
this defect.
The Court of Appeals stated that while there was no evidence showing
that the defective bell apparatus was the cause of the plaintiff's death, the
Court thought that the defendant's negligence need not be the sole cause of
the accident. It appeared there was a loose rope attached to the bell ringer
equipment. The Court of Appeals said that if the jury selected the theory
that the loose rope was a proximate cause which may have caused the engineer
to fall from the engine then the jury was not speculating. Therefore, the
Court of Appeals did not agree with the district court that there was no
evidence that the engineer's death resulted "in part" from the defective bell
ringer, and reversed the decision of the lower court.'
This decision has not been reversed nor have courts receded from this
doctrine that the railroad's negligence may be only a part of the proximate
cause or may be one of indirect inference.
An attorney consulted by an injured railroad employee should examine
the facts for any evidence of negligence on the part of the railroad and
should not be disturbed if, in view of his training in ordinary negligence
actions, there are one or more proximate causes which are to him much more
likely to be the legal cause of the employee's injury.
The second major difference between ordinary negligence cases and
F.E.L.A. negligence cases has to do with the legal phrase "contributory
negligence." In F.E.L.A. cases contributory negligence has been abolished
and comparative negligence is the rule.4 The law reads as follows:
"In all actions hereafter brought against such common carrier by rail-
road under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter to recover
damages for personal injuries to an employee, or where such injuries have
resulted in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of
contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be
diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable
to such employee: Provided, that no such employee who may be injured or
killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case
"Citing Tennant v. Peoria Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 88 L.Ed. 520 (1944).
'35 Stats. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. 53 (1939).
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where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the
safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee." 5
In Terminal R. R. Association v. Fitzohn6 the court said:
"Plaintiff's contributory negligence was a question for the jury and the
jury's determination negating contributory negligence on plaintiff's part
could not be disturbed on appeal on the basis of scienter or as a matter
of law."
In the case of Ellis v. Union Pacific R. Co.' an engine foreman was
injured when he was caught between the side of the railroad car on which
he was riding and the side of a building adjacent to the track. The Court
held that where there is shown any negligence whatever upon the part of the
carrier, either in whole or in part proximately contributing to the plaintiff's
injury, the case must be submitted to the jury, irrespective of plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence, if any; that plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any,
is a question for the jury to determine.'
Another major difference between ordinary negligence actions and
F.E.L.A. cases is this: Under the F.E.L.A. there is no defense based upon
the theory that an employee assumed the risks of his employment.s" Many
times an injured employee receives his injury while violating one or more
of the company rules. It has been said by railroad men who have seniority
whiskers reaching to their knees that it is impossible "to railroad right and
to keep on time" (sic) without violating a rule because the rules are so
complex and in certain ways contravene accepted practices in railroading.
Counsel for the plaintiff need not be disturbed if he finds that an injured
employee has violated the rules, provided, however, that he also finds from
the facts that the company is negligent either in commission or omission.
In the case of Cross v. Spokane P. & S. Ry. Co.,9 the Court held that the
violation of a company rule does not constitute assumption of risk, and that
at the very most it could constitute contributory negligence, leading to the
reduction of damages awarded.
'Numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the several states are
to be found in the annotations, beginning at page 610 of the U.S.C.A., title 45. None of these
contravene the intent and meaning of the language in § 53, particularly the words in italics. This
has not been a controversial section of the act, but see Ericksen v. So. Pac. Co., 105 A.C.A. 1018,
234 P.2d 279 (1951), where the court stated: "Whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent was
first for the jury to determine, then for the judge on new trial motion; that the jury, having been
fully instructed on the subject, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff was negligent,
and the verdict cannot be disturbed for lack of diminution of damages, if there was such lack."
6165 F.2d 473, 1 A.L.R.2d 290 (1948).
7329 U.S. 649, 67 S.Ct. 598, 92 L.Ed. 572 (1947). Reversed on other grounds.
'The 1950 Supplement to the California Approved Jury Instructions contains a fairly complete
set of jury instructions on F.E.L.A. cases. This book may be obtained from the West Publishing
Co. At the request of the Chief Editor, the Honorable William J. Palmer, Judge of the Superior
Court in Los Angeles, California, the writer drafted a set of F.E.L.A. jury instructions. They were
incorporated in the 1950 Supplement, Part 4, and have been generously and well annotated by the
editors. Instructions numbers 301-j and 301-k are instructions on comparative negligence.
"45 U.S.C. 54, amended (1939).
9283 U.S. 821, 51 S.Ct. 345, 75 L.Ed. 1436 (1931).
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The "Assumption of Risk" doctrine was abolished by a statutory amend-
ment of the F.E.L.A. which became effective August 11, 1939. The first case
to reach the United States Supreme Court after the 1939 amendment was
that of Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.'" The plaintiff's husband,
a policeman for the railroad, was inspecting seals on the cars at night when
he met death by accident. The deceased was aware that no lights were used
on the moving cars and that no one would look out for him in making switch-
ing movements. There was no evidence as to what he was doing at the time
he was killed. The train which killed Tiller was backing up. There was a
brakeman with a lantern riding on the rear end on the side opposite to that
where Tiller was found. The engine bell was ringing at the time of the
accident. The district court directed a verdict for the defendant rail-
road on the grounds: (1) That the evidence disclosed no actionable negli-
gence, and (2) The cause of death was speculative and conjectural. The
court of appeals affirnmed, and certiorari was granted because the lower
court's decision was based on a holding that deceased had in effect assumed
the risk of his position. The court in its opinion indicated that it recognized
that in decisions previous to the 1939 amendment assumption of risk had
sometimes been recognized as a defense to negligence, and sometimes has
been held equivalent to non-negligence. The court then states:"
"We hold that every vestige of the doctrine of assumption of risk was
obliterated from the law by the 1939 Amendment, and that Congress, by
abolishing the defense of assumption of risk in that statute, did not mean
to leave open the identical defense for the master by changing its name to,
'non-negligence'."
Under the F.E.L.A. the Employee Is Entitled to Be Furnished a
Reasonably Safe Place to Work.
Nowhere in the Federal Employers' Liability Act is this doctrine men-
tioned. The decisions of the courts have supplied it.
This principle will be covered in detail for two reasons: First, it covers
a substantial number of the legal actions which arise under the F.E.L.A.;
second, under this doctrine the courts as "the living voice of the law" have
steadily extended protection to injured railroad workers, including the spell-
ing out of the recent interesting doctrine of the legal responsibility of the
carrier to take "additional precautions" under certain circumstances.
A leading case which indicates the all-inclusive interpretation of the
United States Supreme Court expressly intended to furnish the highest degree
of legal redress for injured railroad workers is Bailey v. Central Vermont
R. R. Co. 2 Bailey, a section hand, fell from a bridge and was killed -while
10318 U.S. 54, 87 L.Ed. 610, 63 S.Ct. 444 (1943).
11318 U.S. 54, 58.
2319 U.S. 350, 63 S.Ct. 1062,87 LEd. 1444 (1943).
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dumping a hopper car of cinders through the ties of the bridge to the road
below. He was using a wrench which had been used for this purpose for
years without accident. There was no defective equipment and the work was
being done in the customary way. Bailey had been warned that the wrench
would twist if he did not let go of it before the hopper started to open. Bailey
did not let go of the wrench; the wrench twisted around, causing Bailey to
lose his balance and fall to his death.
The widow sued under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, alleging
the railroad had failed to furnish a safe place to work. The United States
Supreme Court, by Mr. Justice Douglas, sustained the plaintiff's claim on
the following grounds: The hopper car could have been opened before it was
moved onto the bridge, or the cinders could have been dumped on the roadbed
and later shoved onto the bridge to fall on the road below. The nature of
Bailey's work, the absence of a guard rail, the height of the bridge from the
ground, the space he had to stand in, the footing which he had, were all facts
for the jury to weigh and appraise, and that it was for the jury to decide
whether the railroad was negligent.
In the Bailey case the Supreme Court emphasized that under our legal
system the jury is the tribunal to decide any debatable issue where fair-
minded men might reach different conclusions. The Court said that the right
to trial by jury is a basic and fundamental feature of our system of juris-
prudence and that to withdraw debatable questions from the jury is to usurp
its function.
Mr. Justice Douglas, in the Bailey decision, pointed out that the duty of
the railroad to furnish a reasonably safe place to work is a continuing one
"from which the carrier is not relieved by the fact that employees' work at
the place in question is fleeting or infrequent."
Equipment Used by the Employee That Is Not Reasonably Safe
May Constitute Failure to Furnish a Reasonably Safe Place to Work.
In the case of Carpenter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 3
the court fbund that it was a question for the jury to decide whether the
railroad had furnished a reasonably safe place to work under circumstances
which concern a motor car accident.
"Plaintiff's husband was killed when the railroad motor car he was oper-
ating was struck by a truck at a crossing. The motor car was so insulated
that it would not operate crossing wigwags or other signals; it had no bell,
whistle, or other warning device. There was evidence that it was traveling
15-20 m.p.h., in violation of the 10 m.p.h. limit set by company rules for
travel at crossings, which rules also require the operator to yield the right of
way to traffic at crossings and to flag over crossings during dense traffic. In
"3109 Cal.App.2d 18, 240 P.2d 5 (1952).
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this action for wrongful death brought under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act' 4 judgment was given for the defendant railroad. The appellate
court's decision reversing the trial court is as follows:
"'1. In determining the question whether there was any evidence of
negligence which should have been submitted to the jury, the federal statutes
and decisions control. (2) The act is to be given liberal construction in order
to accomplish its humanitarian purposes. Under it defendant has the duty
to use reasonable care in furnishing its employees with a safe place to work.
The term Negligence, as used in the act, is a violation of that duty. The
employer is liable for injuries which can be attributed to conditions under
its control when they are not such as a reasonable man ought to maintain in
the circumstances. (3) The evidence being such that fair-minded men might
honestly draw different conclusions as to negligence on defendant's part, the
question is not one of law, but of fact for the jury. (4) The rules governing
the determination of a motion for vacation and entry of another judgment
are the same as those applicable to motions for a judgment of nonsuit and
a directed verdict. (5) The act imposes a liability on a common carrier by
rail for injuries to or the death of an employee resulting in whole or in part
from its negligence. (6) It cannot be said as a matter of law that defendant
complied with its duties in a reasonably careful manner under the circum-
stances shown, nor that the conduct which a jury might find to be negligent
did not contribute in whole or in part to decedent's injuries.'
The Slightest Showing of Negligence Is Sufficient to Take the Case
to the Jury, and Precludes a Determination of the Issue in the Case
Through the Legal Process of Nonsuit, Directed Verdict, or Similar
Legal Device.
The Tiller case is an example of the conclusiveness of the United States
Supreme Court's decision that the question of negligence in Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act cases must go to the jury. The jury returned a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff but the court of appeals reversed.' 5 Certiorari was
granted because of the importance of this case as it related to the adminis-
tration and enforcement of the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
The court of appeals had held the evidence of negligence being insuffi-
cient to justify submission of the case to the jury, the district court should
have directed a verdict in favor of the railroad.
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Black,
said:
"It was for the jury to determine whether the failure to provide this
required light on the rear of the locomotive proximately contributed to the
deceased's death. . ....
"Assuming, without deciding, the railroad could consistently with Rule
131 obscure the required light on the rear of the engine, it does not follow
that, as a matter of law, failure to have the light did not contribute to Tiller's
",45 U.S.C. 51 (1939).
'1142 F.2d 718 (1944).
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death. The deceased met his death on a dark night, and the diffused rays
of a strong headlight even though directly obscured from the front, might
easily have spread themselves so that one standing within three car-lengths
of the approaching locomotive would have been given warning of its pres-
ence, or at least so the jury might have found. The backward movement of
cars on a dark night in an unlit yard was potentially perilous to those com-
pelled to work in the yard. Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. R. Co., 321 U.S. 29,
33, 88 L.Ed. 520, 524, 64 S.Ct. 409. And 'The standard of care must be
commensurate to the dangers of the business.' Tiller V. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co., supra (318 U.S. 67, 87 L.Ed. 617, 63 S.Ct. 444, 143 A.L.R. 967.)"
In the Tennant case the court stated: 6
"It is not the function of a court to search the record for conflicting
circumstantial evidence in order to take the case away from the jury on a
theory that the proof gives equal support to inconsistent and uncertain infer-
ences. The focal point of judicial review is the reasonableness of the partic-
ular inference or conclusion drawn by the. jury. It is the jury, not the court,
which is the fact-finding body. It weighs the contradictory evidence and
inferences, judges the credibility of witnesses, receives expert instruction,
and draws the ultimate conclusion as to the facts. The very essence of its
functions is to select from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that
which it considers more reasonable. . . That conclusion, whether it relates
to negligence, causation, or any other factual matter, cannot be ignored.
Courts are not free to re-weigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict
merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions
or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable."
It is clearly established that the question of negligence in a Federal
Employers' Liability Act action is one to be determined exclusively by the
iury.
A Work-place Away From Railroad-owned or Controlled Property
Does Not Relieve the Railroad of Liability for a Place Unsafe for
Work.
In the case of Ericksen v. Southern Pacific Co.,"7 the court held that it
was immaterial that the place where plaintiff worked was not under the
control of the defendant railroad, since the defendant required the plaintiff
to work there. The plaintiff was employed by defendant to select railroad
ties for it to purchase. Cheney Lumber Co. was a supplier which plaintiff
frequently visited for that purpose. He had to stand on a dock, over 10 feet
above the tracks, where the ties were loaded. There was so little room for
him to stand at a place where the ties were flush with the end of the dock
that he had to lean over to inspect the ends. In so doing he fell and was badly
injured. Damages were awarded to him in a Federal Employers' Liability
Act suit. On appeal the verdict was affirmed, the court saying: (1) The act
10321 U.S. 29, 34-35.
17105 A.C.A. 1018, 234 P.2d 279 (1951), affirmed 39 A.C. 385 (1952).
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applies only to employees of a railroad who are employed in interstate com-
merce. He was thus employed, since the ties were eventually placed on tracks
used in interstate commerce. (2) To recover, the employee must prove that
his injuries were proximately caused by his employer's negligence, which
here was failure to provide a safe place for plaintiff to perform his duties.
The fact that the place was not in defendant's control is immaterial.
In the case of Terminal Railroad Association v. Fitziohn,'8 the plaintiff
was injured when he was knocked off the side of a car by a light standard or
upright located too close to the rail. The track involved was on property
owned by the United States government, and the plaintiff actually knew of
the existence of the upright. The court held the railroad responsible, stating
that it is well established that the railroad has the same duty to furnish its
employees with a reasonably safe place in which to work while on the
premises of another as it does while the employees are on the premises of the
railroad.
If the Employee Uses an Unsafe Place When a Safe Place Is Equally
Available, the Doctrine and the Duty of the Railroad Still Applies.
In the case of Wilkerson v. McCarthy,9 plaintiff was injured while
trying to cross an engine pit on a greasy plank. Plaintiff was walking to the
lavatory. There was a clear, safe pathway which he could traverse to reach
the lavatory, but this route was slightly longer than the route which he chose.
The engine pit was guarded by a chain designed to keep away personnel
who were not employed in repairing the engines. The plaintiff squeezed
between some cars, ducked under the guard chain, and started across the
plank over the engine pit. He slipped on grease on the plank, fell into the
pit, sustaining severe injuries. The Utah Supreme Court agreed with the trial
judge that this was not a case in which there was sufficient evidence of negli-
gence on the part of the carrier to submit the case to the jury.
Certiorari was granted and the United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the carrier is under an obligation to keep all of the premises
and all of the places of work in a reasonably safe condition. The Supreme
Court further held that evidence had been offered that the greasy plank was
not in reasonably safe condition, and that it was a question for a jury to
decide whether or not this greasy plank proximately contributed to the
plaintiff's injury. The Supreme Court further held that although the plain.
tiff had available to him a safer but longer route of travel this did not, as a
matter of law, justify taking the case away from the jury.
18165 F.2d 473, 1 A.L.R.2d 290 (1948).
'1336 U.S. 53, 69 S.Ct. 413, 93 L.Ed. 479 (1949). This case was tried a second time and the
jury found for the defendant; however, the principle of law established by the decision has not been
repudiated.
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The Railroad Is Under a Duty to Warn an Employee of Any Condi-
tion or Circumstance Which Is Hazardous to an Employee in His
Place of Work, Where Such Condition or Circumstance Is or Should
Be Known by the Railroad.
In Terminal Railroad Association v. Howell,2 ° an employee was attempt-
ing to close the door on a railroad car, working under instructions from his
foreman, and while so doing was injured. Defense of the railroad was that
the employee should have been able to see that this out-of-order door was
a hazard, and that therefore the employee caused his own injury. The court
held that the foreman knew or should have known that the out-of-order door
presented a hazardous condition, and that since the foreman failed to give
any warning to the employee the carrier had failed to furnish the employee
with a reasonably safe place to work.
That the Railroad Has Notice, Actual or Constructive, of an Unsafe
Place to Work Is a Matter to Be Left Entirely to the Jury.
In the case of Baltimore & 0. R. v. Flecktner,2" the plaintiff stepped on
a barrel hoop near a track, fell under a car and lost his foot. While the yard
was not fenced, the public did not usually enter the switch yard. The hoop
was rusty, and it was the kind of hoop used on kegs which hold railroad
spikes. The court held that the rusty condition of the hoop was sufficient to
indicate it had been in the switch yard a considerable time, so that the rail-
road, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have known that the hoop was
there and had it removed, and it held that therefore the railroad had failed
to furnish the employee with a reasonably safe place to work.
In the case of Lowden v. Hanson,"2 the plaintiff, while throwing a spring
switch, was injured when the handle broke because of a structural defect.
There was no showing that the company had either actual or constructive
notice of this defect. There was testimony by a railroad man that the defect
in the switch could have been discovered by tapping the parts of the switch
-stand with a hammer. The court held that the failure of the railroad to
inspect the switch constituted a lack of ordinary care and imposed liability
upon the railroad under the act.
Where the Unsafe Place to Work Gives Rise to an Occupational
Disease Rather Than a Traumatic Injury, the Railroad Is Liable.
In the case of Urie v. Thompson,2" the plaintiff, a former fireman on one
of defendant's steam locomotives, filed suit in a state court to recover under
'0165 F.2d 135 (1948).
1300 Fed. 318 (1924).
"134 F.2d 348 (1943).
23337 U.S. 163,69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282, 11 A.L.R.2d 252 (1949).
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the Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries, alleging that after 30 years
of service he had been forced to cease work by silicosis caused by continuous
inhalation of silica dust which arose from sand materials emitted in exces-
sive amounts by the locomotives' faultily adjusted sanding apparatuses.
Upon the plaintiff's first appeal from an adverse judgment the state
supreme court held that the petition failed to state a cause of action for
negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, but stated one under
the Boiler Inspection Act, and hence, remanded the cause for trial, which
resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $30,000, based solely
on a violation by the defendant of the Boiler Inspection Act. This judgment
was reversed by the state supreme court on the ground that the Boiler
Inspection Act did not cover silicosis, that is, disease as distinguished from
injury.
Reversing the judgment of the state supreme court, the United States
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Rutledge, held: That the plain-
tiff's original petition stated a cause of action for negligence under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act and was properly reviewable by the Court;
that the action, brought within three years from the discovery by the plaintiff
of the disease, was not barred by the statute of limitations; and that silicosis
is within the coverage of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, when it results
from the employer's negligence.
The Employee Is Not Required to Anticipate Unsafe Conditions in
the Place of Work and to Take Precautions to Discover Them.
In the case of Harness v. Baltimore and 0. R. R. Co., 4 the court held
that where an employee is without knowledge of risks of employment due
to negligence of the employer, he need not anticipate and take precautions
to discover them, but may assume that the employer has provided a reasonably
safe place to work.
If Extraordinary Precautions by the Railroad Could Have Antici-
pated and Prevented the Development of an Unsafe Place to Work
the Railroad Is Liable. This Is True Though the Railroad Does Not
Have Control of the Place Where the Employee Is Injured.
In Butz v. Union Pacific Co.,25 the plaintiff was injured while riding
on the side of a baggage car, being pushed on a baggage track which ran
adjacent to the platform of the Denver Union Terminal Co., which was
not a part of the Union Pacific Railroad Co. He was hurt by a baggage truck
which was so close to the track that there was not sufficient clearance for his
body between the side of the baggage car and the baggage truck. The trial
judge granted a nonsuit after hearing the plaintiff's evidence.
"'86 W.Va. 284, 103 S.E. 866 (1920).
25233 P.2d 332 (1951).
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The problem in the case was the position taken by the defendant, who
maintained that there was no basis for either its actual or constructive knowl-
edge of a condition of danger which apparently existed through no fault of
employees of defendant Union Pacific Railroad.
The Utah Supreme Court quoted from Boston & M. R. R. v. Meech2"
as follows:
"From the foregoing, it is clear that although some precautions were
taken for the decedents safety, further precautions were possible, and from
this it follows, as we read the decisions cited above, that there was an 'eviden-
tiary basis' for submitting the issue of the defendant's causal negligence
to the jury." (Emphasis added.)
The Utah Supreme Court then points out that in the Wilkerson case
Mr. Justice Douglas reviewed the 55 petitions for certiorari taken from 1943
to 1949, 20 of said writs being granted, establishing the principle of trial
by jury.
The Utah Supreme Court in conclusion makes the following statement,
which should be noted and remembered by every member of the bar who
believes in the right to trial by jury:
"This history, together with the language of the adjudicated cases,
including the Wilkerson case itself, point to one inescapable conclusion:
The Supreme Court of the United States says with unequivocal certainty
that wherever a railroad employee under F.E.L.A. is injured in the course of
duty and there is any evidentiary basis upon which reasonable minds could
believe that reasonable care might have required additional safety measures
which were not taken, and which contributed in whole or in part to cause the
injury, the case should be tried by a jury."
27
From the Above Decisions the Writer Concludes:
1. To entitle the plaintiff to a recovery under the F.E.L.A. it must be
shown that there is some negligence (however slight) upon the part of the
carrier.
2. If there is any evidence from which a jury could infer negligence
upon the part of the defendant, the court shall not interfere with the jury's
right to render a verdict nor set aside a verdict once rendered upon any
factual question and any deviation from the latter principle will constitute
reversible error.
3. That plaintiff is not required to prove that the carrier had actual or
constructive notice as to an unsafe condition at the place he is injured to
entitle him to have a jury determination of the issue; that this is a question
of fact to be determined by the jury, and the presumption is that the employer
26156 F.2d 109 (1946), certiorari denied, 329 U.S. 763.
"7Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., supra, note 10; Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S.Ct.
740, 90 L.Ed. 916 (1945) ; Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752, 62 S.Ct. 854, 86 L.Ed. 1166
(1942).
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has notice since he controls places of work and/or the assignments which
the employee must carry out.28
The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in F.E.L.A. Cases.
In Jesionowski v. Boston & Main R. R. Co.29 a switchman was killed
at night. This switchman had thrown a switch, and then apparently signaled
the train to back up. The switchman's body was not found at a place where
he should have been located. The lower court held that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur did not apply for the reason that the switchman evidently
participated in the switching movement which led to his death. The lower
court said that therefore the defendant railroad was not in complete control
of the agency which caused his death and denied the benefit of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur.
The United States Supreme Court held that the fact that the switchman
participated to some extent did not foreclose the right of the widow-plaintiff
to have the benefit of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The Court said that
the deceased was presumed to have used due care for his safety and that
the backing of the train did kill him. It was proper, therefore, that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur be invoked and it was a question for the jury to
decide whether the railroad was responsible for the death of Jesionowski.3
Rules of Thumb for the Analysis and Trial of F.E.L.A. Cases.
First, does the case come under the act? The act covers employees of
common carriers by rail in interstate commerce. This rules out bus drivers
even for companies owned by the railroads, employees of the Pullman Com-
pany, and of car companies such as the Pacific Fruit Express.
Second, is the injured employee in interstate commerce? A general
rule of thumb is: If you took all of the men away from the railroad who were
doing the particular job or type of work the injured man was doing, would
this substantially affect the carrying on of interstate commerce? If so, the
employee is in interstate commerce. This is obviously not a precise and
all-inclusive definition, but it will help counsel who are not familiar with
this practice.
Third, is there any negligence whatever on the part of the carrier irre-
spective of how negligent you may think the injured railroad man might
have been? If so, there is a liability case.
Fourth, did the injured man file an accident report with the company,
and if so, does he have a copy of it for you?
"'Butz v. Union Pacific Co., 233 P. 2d 332 (1951), and cases cited therein.
29329 U.S. 452, 67 S.Ct. 401, 91 LEd. 416 (1946), see annotation in 169 A.L.R. 947.
'0Leet v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 25 Cal.2d 605, 155 P.2d 42 (1944).
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Fifth, in addition to any general negligence of the railroad, is there a
violation of the Boiler Inspection Act or the Safety Appliance Acts. If so,
this should be pleaded in addition to the allegation of general negligence
under section 51. The allegations need not be divided into separate causes
of action.
Sixth, do not plead that an injured railroad man is totally and perma-
nently disabled on the theory that you are doing him a favor upon the
supposition that subsequent medical studies may tend to show that this is
a fact. You do not need to plead total and permanent disability, and by a
proper allegation of disability which may extend over an indefinite future
time, you give him all the protection that he needs. This point cannot be
overemphasized because if you plead and endeavor to prove permanent and
total disability you may by process of law deprive the injured railroad man
of the most valuable thing he has, his seniority rights. Seniority rights are
property rights. They have been lost for railroad men through their attorneys'
overpleading the case.
Seventh, prospective jurors should be made to understand that the in-
jured railroad man has not received any compensation from any source
whatever, and that he does not come under the benefits of any compensation
law. Superior Court Judges are very reasonable in allowing questions on
voir dire to insure that the prospective jurors understand this. If counsel will
submit in writing a proper statement and special questions to the Federal
Judges they are very conscientious about conveying to the prospective jurors
the fact that the injured railroad man does not have any workmen's compen-
sation coverage.
Eighth, in trying a case counsel should remember that he is entitled to
use the company rule book. This is the "Bible" under which the men work,
and if any of the rules have been violated counsel may read these rules into
evidence and argue them to the jury, showing that the company or its agents
violated the rules, which was part of the cause of the injury to your client."l
Counsel for the plaintiff should always keep in mind in an F.E.L.A.
case that he is representing an employee who has been injured while on duty
and that the employee has no other compensatory relief except to come to
the forum to apply to the jurors for his compensation for his wage loss as a
result of injuries and for loss of earning power as well as for. his pain and
suffering. It is of the greatest importance that counsel make the jury under-
stand this basic proposition.
3'That the company rules may be used in suits where a member of the public is plaintiff, see
So. Pacific Co. v. Haight, 126 F.2d 900 (1942); Nelson v. So. Pacific Co., 8 Cal.2d 648, 67 P.2d
682 (1937). That the Safety Appliance Acts have been held to benefit the public, see U. S. v. State
of California, 296 U.S. 554, 80 L.Ed. 391 (1935). That the Boiler Inspection Act is for benefit of
public, see Urie v. Thompson, supra, note 23.
